I study how job loss experienced by older workers affects the timing of retirement, the decision to claim Social Security benefits, and the lifetime income. I introduce the process of costly job search and layoffs into a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply and savings. I estimate the model using the method of simulated moments and data from the Health and Retirement Study. Displaced workers lose up to 7% of their lifetime consumption, the loss being largely explained by the wage penalty. The cost of layoff is highest for workers who happen to be in the first three deciles of the wealth distribution and are laid off in their early sixties. I discuss the policy measures that can reduce this cost, including changes in Social Security rules and compensation of the wage loss due to displacement. My results suggest that workers who were approaching retirement at the onset of the Great Recession will increase their labor supply by approximately five months in response to the joint impact of changes in the value of household assets and the probabilities of losing and finding a job.
Introduction
Every year over the last decade, on average well over a million US workers age 55 and older have been losing their jobs to layoffs. More than one fifth of the 2010 population between ages 60 and 65 has endured at least one layoff since they turned fifty. Up one third since 1990, the labor force participation rate of workers older than 55 has reached 40%. As the fraction of people who stay employed well into their sixties keeps on growing, those workers increasingly rely on the old age earnings. These numbers emphasize the exposure and vulnerability of an ageing workforce to the consequences of layoffs. 1 This paper examines how job loss experienced by older workers affects labor force attachment, the take up of Social Security, and the retirement income. Laid off individuals on the margin of work and retirement face the cost of search for a new job that is likely to yield lower earnings. Displacement may encourage them to leave the labor force sooner than they had planned and to withdraw Social Security at an earlier age. For others, unemployment spell near retirement may quickly deplete personal savings or impede qualification for higher Social Security payments. Instead of retiring early, laid off workers concerned about their old age income may need to stay in the labor force longer than anticipated. The problem is further exacerbated by the drastic changes in the value of retirement assets that in the recent years have been fluctuating along with the cyclical changes in the labor market.
To address these issues, I develop a dynamic programming model with workers who choose optimal consumption and labor supply, face the costs of job search, and have to decide when to claim Social Security. The model includes uncertainty about availability of jobs, wages, asset returns, health status, medical expenses and survival. It accounts for variability of asset returns, the Social Security rules, Medicare, employer provided health insurance, government transfers, taxes, and intentional bequests. The structural framework allows me to isolate the impact of layoffs, job finding and asset dynamics on the labor supply decisions of older workers. It also identifies a relevant reference group for studying workers affected by job loss. I estimate the model with the method of simulated moments using data from the Health and Retirement Study, 2000-2010 . I compute the cost of job loss and its effect on the lifetime labor supply and income of older workers. Using counterfactuals, I evaluate the outcomes of policies aimed to reduce the cost of layoff, including changes in Social Security rules, assistance in job search, and compensation of the wage loss due to displacement.
My results confirm the intuition that the effect of displacement on labor force attachment differs according to the characteristics of affected workers. A majority of them stop working earlier, yet up to 20% postpone retirement from the labor force on average by one year. Those who increase their lifetime labor supply in response to layoff tend to earn higher wages, hold more assets, and face lower risk of losing a job. My findings suggest that the labor supply of workers who were approaching retirement at the onset of the Great Recession will increase by approximately five months in response to the joint impact of changes in the value of household assets and the probabilities of losing and finding a job.
I estimate the average cost of displacement in terms of lifetime consumption and income as $8,000 (3%) and $15,000 (7%), respectively. The cost of job loss for workers who respond to it by delaying their retirement is negligible. The highest cost, up to 7% of the lifetime consumption, is incurred by individuals in the second to third deciles of the wealth distribution who do not rely on government transfers before layoff and lose their jobs in the early sixties, shortly before reaching the early retirement age. I show that the cost of displacement is mainly driven by the wage reduction experienced by laid off workers. This means that compensating the difference in earnings made before and after job loss will generate the strongest reduction of the cost. Lower penalty for early withdrawal of Social Security can also decrease the cost substantially, while the measures aimed to control the cost of search or increase availability of jobs without affecting the wages have almost no impact.
The literature has often overlooked late career displacement and unemployment because labor market turnover and unemployment rates are relatively low for older workers (Chéron et al., 2007; Rones, 1983) . However, there are good reasons why these issues matter. First, they gain more weight with the overall aging of the workforce that has occurred since the 1980s, as documented by Shimer (2001) . Second, the issues may be larger than they appear from unemployment statistics because low unemployment among older workers may be due to misclassification of the unemployed as non-participating and the prevalence of discouraged workers. Third, low turnover also means that older workers are more likely to be affected by long-term unemployment, as it is the case in many countries (Haan and Prowse, 2010) . This paper is related to several strands in the literature. Most important, it builds upon the papers that have studied retirement from the labor force within the life cycle framework Gilleskie, 2006, 2008; French and Jones, 2011; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986; Rogerson and Wallenius, 2010; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Scholz et al., 2006; van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008) . I extend this literature by incorporating exogenous layoffs, time varying probabilities of job finding, and job search decisions made by workers. None of the previous papers accounts for the possibility of layoffs followed by endogenous and costly job search. Adding these features allows me to employ the familiar life cycle framework to address an entirely new set of questions.
Next, I add to the literature on the long term impact of layoffs on the employment of older workers. The most notable are papers by Stevens (2001, 2004) who have focused on financial incentives to retirement resulting from job loss. While my estimates of the impact of layoffs on labor force attachment are consistent with some of their findings, I contribute to the previous work using the life cycle setup to perform policy experiments and evaluate broader range of the consequences of displacement. I also model a richer representation of the labor supply, search and savings decisions that are not well studies for in these papers.
Finally, there is a literature that focuses on the dynamics of retirement from the labor force over the business cycle. Coile and Levine (2011a,b) ; Goda et al. (2011); McFall (2011) have implemented a reduced form approach to study retirement in recessions. Gustman et al. (2010) estimate the impact of stock market decline on retirement using a life cycle model, however they abstract from the role of labor market fluctuations. In contrast to the existing work, my model quantifies the combined effects that wealth changes and layoffs have on the labor market behavior of older workers. This framework is more suitable to explore the long term effects of stock and labor markets, and helps to identify their impact.
The rest of the paper contains seven sections. Section two provides some basic data facts on job loss and retirement. Section three explains the life cycle model with job search. Section four describes the estimation methods. Section five introduces the dataset used in the estimation. Section six discusses estimation results, and section seven describes policy experiments and counterfactuals. Section eight concludes.
Facts about job loss and retirement
I highlight some facts on displacement and labor force attachment in the data. I want to find out how prevalent layoffs are among older workers, and discuss associations between job loss and transitions from work to retirement. My analysis is based on monthly employment histories of older males compiled from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/), a nationally representative panel of individuals over age 50. I construct employment histories using questions about the labor force status and the changes in employment that took place between the survey waves.
I define a person as out of the labor force if he neither worked for pay nor looked for work in the last twelve months. I base this definition on the previous in addition to the current labor force status because the HRS does not contain information on job search between the survey waves. By taking lagged job search reports, I can identify some of the long term searches that could otherwise be mistakenly taken as labor force exits. I observe 4,798 exits from the labor force made by 4,166 individuals after age 50.
To evaluate how many individuals have experienced layoffs, I turn to the information on their labor force status and reported separation reasons. I consider a worker laid off if the separation reason given in the HRS is either laid off/let go or business closed. Quits are all other separation reasons, such as quit, health, family, new job, retirement or financial incentives. I have information on 2,091 layoffs that have affected 23% of individuals with observed separations. Almost 9% of exits from the labor force happened within a year after a layoff. Another 2% of workers who have left the labor force lost their most recent job to a layoff, stayed without work for more than a year and eventually retired. I consider these 11% of the labor force exits as a lower boundary on the number of workers whose participation decisions have been directly affected by layoffs. Counting previous job losses among workers who quit or did not report separation reason, every one in six older non-participating workers has a record of layoff since the age fifty.
The magnitude of the problem may be even larger given the lack of clear distinction between layoffs and quits. Poterba and Summers (1984) find that 25% of the Current Population Study (CPS) respondents who originally reported quits changed separation reason to layoff in the next month of data collection. In line with these findings for the CPS, I observe that the quits in the HRS are often preceded with adverse changes in employment situation. Roughly 12% of the quits happened with encouragement from co-workers, expectation of a layoff, anticipation of reduction in wages or hours, and similar reasons. Once retired, as many as one third of the respondents claim that they have been at least to some extent forced into their decision. Overall, I conclude that between 11 and 30% of the first time exits from the labor force have been affected by involuntary separations from their employers.
Next, I discuss the data that characterize the relationship between job loss and participation decision. I examine employment choices made by workers with previous layoff experience between fifty and the first time exit from the labor force that lasts for twelve months. The majority of displaced workers with complete observed spells (74%) get reemployed with an average search duration of six months. Another 21% leave the labor force a year after job loss, and the remaining 5% retire later without finding a job. The average length of search period for the last group is 27 months, which coincides with the current definition of long term unemployment by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The percent retired a year after layoff rises rapidly with age, ranging from only 3% at ages 50-55 to more than 50% after 70.
To gain a better understanding of post-displacement employment in the long run, I isolate a group of workers who have been laid off at sixty and follow up their labor force status over the next ten years. Figure 1 plots the percent of employed, unemployed and out of labor force persons in this group against the time elapsed since layoff. It also shows the percent of workers retired from the labor force among those who were employed at sixty and have never been observed as laid off in the data. Twelve months after a layoff just under a half of displaced workers are employed at another job, 20% continue searching, and 27% are out of the labor force. In the meantime, only 1% of non-displaced sixty year olds leave the labor force within the next year. It takes almost three years for the non-displaced group to reach comparable retirement level of 20%. The non-participation rates in the two groups do not equalize even after ten years, and the average number of months worked by non-displaced workers over the remaining lifetime is 27% higher.
At face value, these results would suggest that job loss triggered early retirement. This is consistent with the literature claiming that job loss and unemployment at older ages are strongly correlated with the early exit from the labor force Stevens, 2001, 2004; Coile and Levine, 2011b) . However, these observations should be treated with caution: if workers who are at higher risk of displacement are systematically different from the rest, the difference in the timing of retirement may be driven by selection. To explore this proposition, I compare expected and observed time of retirement for workers who have been displaced at least once after the age fifty and those who have not.
I use the earliest available value of the HRS RAND variable reporting the year of planned retirement to measure the expected age of exit from the labor force. The variable is based on the questions that ask about the year in which respondent thinks to retire or stop working. I compare this age to the earliest age when a worker has been out of the labor force for twelve consecutive months, and do not find enough evidence to support the hypothesis that job loss compels people to retire earlier. The responses tend to be biased upwards: on average people leave the labor force about five quarters earlier than expected. However, there is no statistically significant difference in the relationship between expected and observed age conditional on layoff experience. Therefore, I propose that the characteristics of workers at high risk of displacement are essential to the understanding of the variations in the observed patterns of labor force attachment, and appropriate control for selection bias should be at the center of any inquiry that attempts to study job loss.
There are further concerns that complicate the choice of a control group to be used in the empirical analysis for comparison with laid off workers. Because labor market behavior varies widely with the age at which job loss occurs, comparing workers displaced at different ages may not be useful. The choice between work and retirement after a layoff also depends crucially on the labor market conditions. More people will tend to stay in the labor force when search is fast and cheap, and human capital depreciation is low. As a result, comparison of workers who have been laid off at different stages of the business cycle may be inappropriate. Because of these differences and the rare occurrence of layoffs among older workers, the data samples available for empirical analysis are restrictive and fairly small. It is especially the case for the demographic groups that so far have experienced too few layoffs to provide any usable data at all. Yet, because of the changes in occupational and industrial structure, knowing the impact of possible job loss for these groups of population is as important as it is for the groups that have long been known as the most affected.
These considerations motivate me to use a life cycle model of work and retirement with costly job search to analyze of the impact of late career job loss on labor force attachment, consumption and income of older workers over the lifetime. I address the composition effects by introducing two types of workers that are characterised by different levels of layoff risk. In addition, I differentiate workers in the model by year of birth and use time varying probabilities of losing and finding job to control for the labor market environment at different ages. By using counterfactuals to simulate the impact of job loss on the labor market outcomes of older workers, I overcome the issues related to the small sample sizes and the choice of a relevant control group.
3 Model of labor supply, search and retirement I develop a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply and retirement similar to French and Jones (2011) . The main difference of my approach from the existing literature is in the inclusion of search frictions together with stochastic returns on assets. The model describes decision problem of an older worker facing uncertainty about available employment opportunities, wages, asset returns, health, medial expenses, and survival. In each period of life, workers make decisions on labor supply, consumption and savings, job search, and the take up of Social Security. The model incorporates essential Social Security rules, taxes and government transfers, Medicare and employer provided health insurance. It also accounts for individual heterogeneity in terms of the lifetime earnings, year of birth, the risk of layoff, and access to health insurance. The model provides a framework to analyze the impact of job loss and variability of asset returns on the labor market behavior of older workers. I proceed with discussion of the key elements of the model.
Preferences
In each period an individual aged t = 57, . . . , T derives utility from consumption C t and leisure L t . The within-period utility function is nonseparable in consumption and leisure,
as in French (2005) . θ 1 ∈ [0, 1] is the consumption weight, θ 2 ≥ 0 is the risk aversion parameter. Individuals face exogenous mortality risk that depends on age, binary indicator of bad health conditions H t = {0, 1}, and income type defined by the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), τ AIME . Individual aged t survives to age t + 1 with probability π t (H t , τ AIME ). Everybody dies with probability one upon reaching the terminal age T . Individuals who die leave all their assets as bequest to the heirs. The value of bequest in the amount A t is determined by a bequest function that follows Abel and Warshawsky (1988) and De Nardi (2004) 
where coefficient b 1 captures the strength of the bequest motive and b 2 determines to what extent the bequest is a luxury good.
Time constraint
The quantity of leisure depends on the amount of labor hours N t supplied out of a fixed endowment L, the fixed cost of work, health, and the cost of job search decision s t = {0, 1}:
where the indicator function denotes labor force participation. The expression says that for the employed individuals the maximum amount of leisure equal to the entire time endowment is reduced by the number of hours worked and the fixed cost of work. The fixed cost of work is a linear function of age determined by the parameters φ 0 and φ 1 : as people grow older, they have to give up more of their free time in order to stay employed. The leisure of individuals who decide to work in spite of being in poor health (H t = 1) is further reduced by ψ hours a month. Unemployed individuals looking for work (s t = 1) have to spend c hours a month in search related activities.
Budget constraint
Individuals collect taxable income Y t from wage earnings, Social Security, and returns on assets:
Wage earnings are determined by the wage rate W t and the hours of labor supply N t . The binary indicator of layoff status = {0, 1} takes a value one if a worker has ever been laid off from a job and zero otherwise. The wages of displaced workers are permanently reduced by a factor d 1 . This reduction is interpreted as a loss of human capital or obsoleteness of skills that made a layoff necessary. If a worker chooses part-time employment (less than 120 hours per month in the estimation), his hourly wage rate is decreased by a factor d 2 .
The size of Social Security benefits, SSB t (·), is calculated based on the age of application t a , individual type τ i defined by the AIME and the year of birth, and parameters of the Social Security system τ SS . Individuals who have applied draw a constant stream of benefits until death.
The assets A t of an individual belonging to the type τ i are invested at the rate of return r t,τ i that varies over time. The rates of return vary by worker type to account for the portfolio structure of investors in different income brackets. No borrowing is allowed, A t ≥ 0. The budget constraint is
where function y(Y t , τ) gives after tax income for a tax code described by parameter τ. M t (·) is out of pocket medical expenses that depend on health conditions and access to insurance. A categorical variable I t represents insurance status and may take three values: not insured, insured by employer, and insured through Medicare. G t are the government transfers. The expression captures that the value of assets in the next period is determined as the value of the income and government transfers received in the current period and added to the previously accumulated assets, after deduction of the current period consumption and medical expenses. Assets in the simulated data are measured with an error ε a t ∼ N(0, σ 2 ε a ), so that A sim t = A t · exp(ε a t ). This adjustment reconciles the model predictions with the individual decisions observed in the data.
The government provides a minimum consumption level c through transfers G t according to the rule
as in Hubbard et al. (1995) . This formulation requires that after tax income reduces the amount of government transfers dollar for dollar. Individuals must deplete personal assets before gaining access to the consumption floor provided by the government, and the entire amount of transfers must be consumed in the same period as received. The consumption floor helps explain low saving rates among poor households (Dynan et al., 2004) .
Recursive formulation
The vector of state variables S t for an individual of type τ i alive at age t includes the wage rate, medical expenses and health status, job loss and job finding draws, assets, lagged employment and search decisions, and social security status,
Depending on the current labor force status, an individual can make decisions D t about the levels of consumption and savings, labor supply, job search and take up of Social Security. The vector of decision variables is D t (S t ) = (C t , N t ,t a , s t ). The number of labor supply hours N t = 0 for nonworkers and N t · s t = 0, which rules out simultaneous possibility of search and employment. Timing in the model is as follows. In the beginning of each period an individual can be working, unemployed and looking for work, or out of the labor force. All individuals regardless of their labor force status start the period with receiving two exogenous shocks that determine health state and medical expenditures.
Employed individuals receive another shock that destroys their jobs with probability δ t,τ i .
Those workers who did not lose jobs then receive updated information about their wages. In the meantime, unemployed workers receive offers from wage distribution P(W t |S t−1 , D t−1 , θ p ) with probability λ t,τ i . Once the wages are revealed, workers who retained their jobs or received new offers make labor supply decisions. Workers who just lost their jobs or quit, unemployed who did not receive acceptable offers, and workers who have been out of labor force decide whether they want to invest time into looking for work. If they decide to search, they start the next period as unemployed and have a chance to receive a job offer. Otherwise they start the next period out of the labor force.
Next, all individuals make decisions on Social Security application, collect income, pay the medical expenses and taxes, enjoy the leisure, consume and save. Finally, they get hit by survival shock and either move to the next period or die and leave bequests.
In each period and state S t , an individual chooses a decision rule D t to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility subject to the exogenous processes for mortality, employment, health, medical expenses and wage determination, a set of budget and time constraints (5) and (3), government transfer rule (6), and policies for taxes and Social Security. The discount rate for future payoffs is β . The values of states with a wage offer (V w ) and without a wage offer (V n ) are defined recursively as
where θ is a vector of estimated parameters and θ p ⊂ θ are parameters of state transition probability function. Because the model does not have a closed form solution, the decision rules it generates must be found numerically. Setting the terminal age T to 100, the maximum working age to 75, and the starting age to 57 years, I use backward induction solve the value functions at monthly time intervals. I estimate the model parameters using method of simulated moments. The details of my estimation procedure are discussed in section 5.
Data
I use primarily Health and Retirement Study (HRS, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/) dataset, a nationally representative panel of individuals after age fifty, HRS RAND dataset (version L), and restricted HRS data on the SSA earnings records. In addition, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS, http://www.census.gov/cps/) to estimate job finding probabilities. Below I describe the estimation sample obtained form the HRS and explain how I use the data to draw the initial state for the simulations.
Estimation dataset
HRS data were collected in ten waves covering the period from 1992 The HRS sample used in estimation includes white non-hispanic males aged 57 and above, who have ever worked for pay for more than a few months and were interviewed in the community. I exclude individuals with top and bottom 1.5% wages and assets, those who report receiving Social Security before 62, and recipients of Social Security Disability Insurance. The retained sample contains information on 11,405 individuals. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for this dataset.
For structural estimation I restrict the dataset to individuals who were aged 58-60 in 2000, born between 1940 and 1943 . This restriction leaves a sample of 3,779 observations for 299 individuals. I assume all of them were born in the middle of the year and estimates the model with four age types corresponding to the year of birth.
I use HRS information on age, employment, labor supply, separation reasons, earnings an income, assets, Social Security, health, education, marital status, medical expenses and mortality. The measure of assets is the net value of total wealth, computed as the sum of all wealth components less all debt. All monetary values are reported in 2000 dollars. I use HRS restricted data to compute average lifetime earnings and AIME.
I use the HRS data for few purposes. First, I use this dataset to estimate exogenous state transition probabilities, as discussed in Section 5.2. Second, I draw initial conditions from joint empirical distribution of age, health, assets, wages, medical expenses, employment and search for the simulation. Finally, I compute data moments that are matched in the estimation procedure.
Individual heterogeneity and initial conditions
I model sixty four types of individuals, different by year of birth, earnings histories, the risk of being laid off, and access to health insurance. The year of birth is essential in establishing the age at different stages of the business cycle, so that I know the probabilities of job loss and job finding as a worker approaches the retirement. I include four years of birth, from 1940 to 1943.
The four earnings types are defined by the quartiles of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). For respondents who granted access to their Social Security Administration (SSA) records I construct AIME by indexing wages to year 2000 and taking an average of the top 35 values, using zeroes if not enough years are reported. SSA earnings histories are available for 76% of the estimation sample. For other observations I use regression based imputation (David et al., 1986) . I model log AIME as a function of assets, health status, labor force participation, and the total number of years working. I set the values to zero for those who report never working.
I use the HRS question on the likelihood that the respondent would lose job during the next year from the expectations section of the survey to measure perceived probabilities of displacement. I regress this measure on age quadratic, schooling, health indicator, number of jobs held, total years of employment, AIME, industry and occupation with the longest tenure, and year and regional dummies. The estimates of regression equation are shown in Table 2 . I use these estimates to predict the probability of layoff and average predicted probabilities over available time periods. I assign an individual to a high layoff risk type if this measure exceeds 50%, and to a low risk type otherwise. My indicator of perceived layoff probability is correlated with the actual layoff experience, and the differences in the mean layoff probability between low risk and high risk groups are statistically significant. Monthly probability of layoff is .001 for low risk and .003 for high risk group. The fraction of workers with recorded layoff experience is .132 for low risk and .293 for high risk group.
Individuals are assigned to two types based on their access to the employer provided health insurance. I assume that the health insurance status does not change with employer. A worker of insured type starting a new job automatically retains access to the health insurance, while uninsured worker can not change his status by switching jobs. This assumption is consistent with the data: over three forth of workers who switched their jobs between the HRS survey waves retained their health insurance status in a later wave. Loss of job leads to immediate termination of coverage for insured workers. The consumption floor provided by the government accounts for the role of Medicaid in the model. I count workers insured through the spouse's employer, individually purchased or other government plans as uninsured. All these groups make a small fraction of the sample. After the age 65 health insurance types are no longer relevant because by assumption all workers rely primarily on Medicare.
I draw initial conditions on the assets, wage, health, medical expenses, health insurance, labor supply and layoff risk jointly for 628 individuals of each type defined by earnings and year of birth, using HRS weights. Health insurance and the risk of layoff are drawn from the data in order to reflect their systematic variation with the level of income. Descriptive statistics for the initial state distribution is shown in Table 10 . Initial conditions for asset distribution are modified in the simulation to account for the presence of a measurement error.
Estimation methods
I estimate the model parameters in two steps similar to Gourinchas and Parker (2002) ; De Nardi et al. (2010); French and Jones (2011) . First, I estimate the parameters of the Markov state transition probability distribution functions and set the values of parameters θ p that can be determined outside of the structural framework without using the whole model. Next, I take the first stage estimates as given and use the method of simulated moments (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989; Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996) to estimate the remaining parameters. The vector of thirteen parameters estimated in the second step, θ s , includes parameters of the utility and bequest functions, the fixed costs of work, health and search cost, wage loss due to human capital depreciation and part time employment, government transfers, the leisure endowment, and the variance of the measurement error,
Method of simulated moments
I match employment rates, share of part time workers, labor supply, job search rates and asset deciles for each age between 60 and 70, altogether giving 143 moment conditions. The estimatê θ s is chosen to minimize the weighted distance between the moments observed in the data,K, and their simulated counterparts that are generated by the model, k(θ ,θ p ):
Ω is a symmetric positive semi-definite weighting matrix. I use a diagonal weighting matrix that contains the elements of the inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the sample moments along the diagonal and is zero elsewhere. The asymptotically efficient weighting matrix would have been the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the sample moments estimates. I choose a diagonal weighting matrix because of a possible bias in small samples (Pischke, 1995; Altonji and Segal, 1996) . This choice of weights implies that the moments that were estimated with higher precision would be given higher weight in the estimation, while dependence between the moments is not allowed. I find a solution to the equation (9) by taking the following steps.
1. Compute sample moments and weighting matrix Ω from the estimation dataset. Estimate the first stage parameters θ p from the data. These estimates give parameters of the processes that determine transitions between the points of state space: health, survival, medical expenses, wages, job loss and job finding, and asset returns. I also describe the rules set for taxes and Social Security.
2. Use random draws with replacement from the estimation dataset to generate initial conditions for 10,000 simulated individuals. Initial conditions include wage rate, health, medical expenses, assets, labor supply and search indicator for each individual type τ i . The probability of selection is inversely proportional to the HRS individual weight. I start modeling individual histories at age 58, and compute the sample moments for ages 60-70 omitting one period to draw the initial state.
3. Generate matrices of random shocks for wages, health, mortality, job loss and job finding using the first stage estimatesθ p .
4. Choose the initial guess of parameters θ s,0 and solve the model numerically by backward induction to obtain the decision rules for each individual type. I discretize the state space into a grid and use linear interpolation and extrapolation to evaluate the value function between and outside the grid points respectively. At each node of the grid, I solve for optimal consumption, labor supply, search and Social Security decisions. To simplify the computational problem I assume that everybody applies for Social Security by full retirement age and stops working at 75. I assign large negative values to the decisions that are ruled out by the model constraints.
5. Using initial conditions, shocks and decision rules, simulate a dataset that contains a life path for each simulated individual. Compute the moments from simulated data and find the distance between empirical and simulated moments using (9).
6. Select the next value of θ s that improves the value of objective function and repeat steps 4 and 5 until the convergence criterion is met to obtain the estimateθ s . I use simplex algorithm to search over parameter space on a 16-node cluster. Pakes and Pollard (1989) show that under the regularity conditions the estimatorθ is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed with variance-covariance matrix V given by
where D is Jacobian matrix of the population moment vector, S is variance-covariance matrix of the data and W = plim n→∞ Ω n . I use sample analogs to estimate these matrices to compute the standard errors.
State transition probabilities
Individuals face uncertainty about future survival, health, medical expenses, wages, job finding, job loss, and asset returns. I assume rational beliefs about the likelihood of future events, and use a parametric Markov transition probability function Pr(S t+1 |S t , D t , θ p ) to describe them. I assume conditional independence and decompose the state transition probabilities into a product of marginal conditional probabilities for individual state variables. Each component of the transition probability distribution is estimated independently, and then multiplied to obtain the final value. The discussion of estimation methods used and results for each component follows.
Health and mortality
I estimate biennial survival and health transition probabilities from the HRS data on white males. I use binary logit models conditional on age, lagged health, and average lifetime income. Tables 3 and 4 contain estimated marginal effects. Health status is determined from self-report. The Physical Health section of the HRS contains a question: "Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?". I define good health as the combined self-reported categories "excellent", "very good" and "good", and bad otherwise.
To obtain monthly transition probabilities, I assume that there are exactly twenty four months between survey dates. 2 I further assume that monthly health transition probabilities remain constant over two year period. Then I retrieve a two by two matrix of monthly health transition probabilities P m from the matrix of biennial transition probabilities P b using the relationship P b = P 1/24 m . For monthly survival probabilities I assume that the probability of death is the same in any month within a two year period, so that π m = 1 − (1 − π b )/24.
Medical expenses
Out of pocket medical expenses M t follow an error components model with autoregressive error term:
where ζ m t is persistent AR(1) component of medical expenses with autocorrelation ρ m , and ε m t is white noise. 3 The mean of log medical expenses M(t) depends on age and health status indicator. I estimate the process separately for three types of health insurance access: employer provided, Medicare, and not insured.
Medical expenses are measured using HRS RAND individual out of pocket medical expenditures variable. This measurement includes the costs of hospital and nursing home stays, doctor and dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drug, home health care and special facilities paid by respondent in the reference period. It does not include expenditures paid by insurance. I drop reports of zero medical expenses from estimation.
I estimate parameters of Equation (11) Table 6 . To solve the model, I approximate AR(1) process for the medical expense shock ζ m with a first order three-node discrete Markov chain using Rouwenhorst method (Rouwenhorst, 1995; Kopecky and Suen, 2010) .
Wage transition probabilities
Estimation of the wage process is similar to medical expenses, except that I first have to impute missing wages and unobserved wages of nonworking individuals that together make up about 60% of the sample. I use Heckman maximum likelihood estimator to correct for selection bias. The determinants of mean log wage rate are age quadratic and years of education. Selection equation is identified by log AIME, log non labor income, health and marital status. I control for region of residence and year in both equations. Estimated parameters of wage and selection equations are reported in Table 7 . I predict the mean wage rates from this model, and then use regression based imputation to fill in the missing values.
Similar to medical expenses, I then model the wage transitions as an error component process with AR(1) disturbances:
Mean wage W (t) depends on age quadratic, AIME and health, and parameters of monthly AR(1) error process are inferred from estimated biennial values. The process is estimated us-ing HRS data on white males age 50 and above, omitting the top and bottom 1% of wage rates. Estimated parameters of the wage equations and variances of shocks are reported in Table 8 . In simulations permanent component is discretized into five nodes discrete Markov chain.
Job finding and layoff probabilities I compute job finding probabilities from the gross flows of workers between three labor force states: employment, unemployment and not in the labor force. I obtain sample-weighted monthly gross flows from the rotating part of the CPS monthly microdata on males ages 55 and above. 4 I seasonally adjust these series with Census Bureau's X-12 procedure and compute monthly transition probabilities between the three states. I correct for time aggregation bias using Shimer's method (Shimer, 2012 ) that assumes continuous time environment with data available at discrete points. I estimate Markov transition probabilities in a system with three states and use a probability that a worker unemployed in month t will move to employment state within one month as job finding probability in my model.
Layoff probabilities are computed from the HRS recalled job histories. In this case I can not use the CPS data because it does not contain separation reasons for workers who have left the labor force. I use information on the separation reason, considering layoffs answer options "Business closed" and "Laid off/Let go". HRS asks about separation reasons for the jobs held in the previous wave of the survey and up to two additional jobs that the respondent has worked between the waves. My method may underestimate layoff probability for those workers who change more than three jobs within the two year period between the survey waves. I adjust obtained monthly layoff probabilities by a factor of 1.3 for the type at high risk of layoff, and by a factor of .5 for the type at low risk of layoff. Adjustment coefficients are based on the overall difference of layoff probability for high and low risk type in the data.
I take twelve month centered moving average to measure job finding and layoff probabilities in the months with available data. Beyond the period of observation I level out probabilities to the sample averages over a period of three years. Because I assume rational expectations, workers have full information on these probabilities but do not know exactly how layoffs and job finding are going to affect their employment path. The mean values of the estimated series are λ = .24 and δ = .003. Both probabilities for older workers are lower than their counterparts for all ages. This is consistent with the studies documenting that mobility between labor force states in panel datasets declines with age (e.g., Menzio et al. (2012) ).
Social Security
The amount of Social Security benefits is determined based on the individual earnings history, the choice of time for benefits application and the rules of the Social Security system. I incorporate the following stylized facts about the Social Security into the model. 1. Primary insurance amount. The amount of benefits is based on the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) that I define in a way similar to the SSA approach. I first compute the AIME by averaging individual indexed earnings in the best 35 working years. Indexing is done with the national wage index. The primary insurance amount is then calculated using two bend points as a sum of 90% of the AIME under the first point, 32% of the AIME between the two points, and 15% of the AIME in excess of the second point. I use the SSA bend points that are set for each year of birth.
2. Minimum and maximum of benefits. The special minimum amount of benefits is set for low wage earners with duration of coverage between 11 and 30 years. I use the minimal PIA to to the SAA year specific minimum for a worker with twenty years of coverage.
The maximum amount of benefits received by a family is computed with three threshold values. The formula is 150% of the PIA under the first threshold, plus 272% of the PIA between thresholds one and two, plus 134% of the PIA between thresholds two and three, and plus 75% of the PIA above threshold three. I incorporate this rule into the model with cohort specific threshold values.
3. Retirement age. The earliest age at which an individual becomes eligible for benefits is 62. The normal retirement age is gradually changing from 65 to 67 for the HRS respondents. I include individuals born in 1940-1942 in structural estimation, and take the normal retirement age for workers born in each year. I also require that everybody applies for benefits by the normal retirement age. The model does not offer incentives to restrain from drawing the benefits longer, yet this assumption reduces the computational burden.
4. Early and delayed retirement. The PIA determines the amount of benefits an individual would receive applying at full retirement age. This amount may be either reduced or increased if benefits are claimed before or after reaching the normal retirement age respectively. I ignore credit for delayed retirement and only reduce the amount of benefits by 8% for each year of retirement before the normal retirement age.
Taxes
Individuals pay Federal, State and payroll taxes. I take Federal tax rates from the annual Tax Rate Schedules, Head of household tables. The State tax rates are taken from Rhode Island Tax Rates Schedule 5 Payroll taxes include Social Security and Medicare taxes. They amount to 7.65% up to a year specific maximum, and 1.45% that cover Medicare's Hospital Insurance only above this amount 6 . Here and elsewhere in the paper I convert the annual thresholds to monthly on a pro rata basis. In addition, the Social Security benefits of early retirees may be taxed in accordance with Social Security Earnings Test. The benefits are taxed if earnings exceed retirement earnings exempt amounts. I use the lower exempt amount that applies in years before reaching the normal retirement age, and ignore the higher amount that applies in the year of reaching the normal retirement age for the months prior to the attainment. The benefits are taxed at a rate $1 in benefits for every $2 of earnings in excess of the lower exempt amount. The lower amount in 2005 is $12,000 (http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLA/rtea.html). Because the sample period only covers the years after 2000, Social Security Test does not apply after the normal retirement age. I also ignore the refund of withheld benefits after the normal retirement age.
Asset returns and discounting
Workers expect that the annual rate of return on their assets is 4%, which is consistent with estimates by McGrattan and Prescott (2003) . Yet the realized return values are computed so as to account for the housing bubble and dynamics of the stock market that are entirely unanticipated by the workers. The annual discount rate for future payoffs β = .96.
Each simulated worker invests wealth in housing, stock and other assets. Stock holdings consist of direct stock ownership and the share of IRA invested in stock. I ignore defined contribution pensions invested in stock. The share of wealth invested in each asset depends on the worker's income type. For example, workers of higher income types hold more wealth in stock. I use the HRS RAND variables to assess the net value of housing, direct stock holdings, IRA and total assets. I take the share of stock in the IRA from Gustman et al. (2010) . Using these data, I compute the mean shares of assets held by workers of each income type.
The return on a portfolio held by a worker of given income type is a weighted average of returns on individual assets. The rate of return on stock is a twelve months moving average of total real returns on large company stock taken from Ibbotson Associates (2013). Housing appreciation is computed from the FHFA all-transaction indexes. I take a twelve-month moving average of the series and adjust for inflation using the CPS "All items less shelter" index.
Annualized rate of return on other asset is 4%, and the portfolio returns converge to the 4% rate over three years after the end of observed series.
Estimates of structural parameters
The MSM estimates are chosen to match the average hours of labor supply, employment and part-time employment rates, asset deciles, and search intensity by age that are observed in the HRS data. In this section I discuss the values of estimated parameters and identification strategies. Table 11 provides the MSM estimates of the structural parameters of the model. Figure 2 shows the model fit for matched moments.
The estimate of 5.6 for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, θ 2 , is within the range of values found in the literature. On the lower end of this range are the values around one in Rust and Phelan (1997) ; Gilleskie (2006, 2008) ; Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) or 3.7 in De Nardi et al. (2010) . The values on the higher end exceed seven as in French and Jones (2011) and French (2005) . My estimate implies relative risk aversion for consumption rather than consumption-leisure bundle equal to 4.18 under assumption of fixed labor supply. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is identified by asset quantiles that reflect the extent of precautionary savings against the adversity of losing income or paying medical expenses.
The estimate of the consumption weight parameter, θ 1 = 0.688, is similar to the weighted average of the estimates obtained by French and Jones (2011) for different types of preferences, 0.623. The consumption weight reflects individual preferences for work and is identified primarily by the hours of labor supply.
The monthly fixed cost of work for a sixty year old worker is 137 hours, or one third of monthly time endowment. Estimated slope suggests that over a year the monthly fixed cost of work increases by 5.6 hours. My model yields about the same fixed cost as French and Jones (2011) for a 62 year old worker. The fixed cost parameters are identified by declining trends in participation rates and labor supply.
The estimated cost of search parameter equals 71.5 hours per month, suggesting that looking for work takes about the same time as half-time employment. Wage loss associated with displacement is one third of the wage received by otherwise similar non-displaced worker. The cost of search and wage loss are identified by the share of non-working individuals who look for work at each age, and by variation of job finding probabilities.
Part-time worker takes a 22% reduction in wage rates. This parameter is identified by the rate of part time employment, and the value is consistent with 25% penalty found by Aaronson and French (2004) . The monthly government transfer c = $291 is identified by lower asset quantiles because guaranteed consumption minimum discourages saving among poor. In annual equivalent it is on the same scale with consumption floor in Hubbard et al. (1995) . Pa-rameters of bequest function are identified by upper quantiles of the asset distribution. The monthly time endowment, L, is 407 hours, identified jointly by employment and labor supply moments.
I further provide some results on model fit beyond matched moments and check whether it matches the data that were not directly used in estimation. I am especially interested in checking whether the model can match any of the facts on layoffs and retirements that motivate the paper. I compute some of these statistics from the simulated data and compare it with respective data moments.
The model predicts well the number of workers affected by layoffs over lifetime, but underestimates slightly the number of those affected between ages 60 and 65. While the share of workers affected by layoffs is very close in the simulation and in the data, the model predicts that the consequences of layoffs are much less severe than what is observed in the data. Only 3% of displaced workers retire twelve month after a layoff, compared to 11% in the data. Similarly, only 2.5% of workers laid off at age sixty retire twelve months later, which is more than five times lower than the same number in the data. Consistently with the data, the share of workers who retire after a layoff grows steadily until peaking at age 65.
The predicted difference in the timing of retirement for laid-off and non-laid-off workers is somewhat larger than in the data. Displaced workers on average retire later both in the data and in the model, yet in the model the difference is over two years comparing to only eleven months in the data.
Discussion and counterfactuals
In this section I use estimated model to evaluate the impact of job loss on employment and lifetime consumption of older workers. I start with the analysis of labor force attachment following a layoff. Next, I evaluate the loss of lifetime consumption due to displacement and consider the role of the mechanisms that generate this loss. Because the incidence and consequences of layoffs are related to the probabilities of losing and finding a job, I discuss in a separate section how the behavior of displaced workers varies over the business cycle. I also show how the impact of the labor market conditions on employment decisions of displaced workers interacts with unexpected shocks to the value of assets. To illustrate this point, I estimate the effect of the Great Recession on retirement decisions of workers who have reached their late fifties by the beginning of the economic downturn. In conclusion, I present the results of policy experiments aimed to alleviate the negative consequences of job loss.
Labor force attachment after a layoff
First, I show how a layoff experience affects labor force attachment and retirement throughout the remaining life time. I simulate and compare behavior of identical pool of workers under different scenarios. Under the first baseline scenario the workers never lose their jobs even though they anticipate such possibility when making their decisions. In each other scenario all workers are laid off at a specific age that ranges between 58 and 70. The life path of these simulated individuals therefore completely coincides with the baseline scenario up to the age of job loss, and the differences after this age are solely attributed to the experience of job loss.
Comparison of the paths that the laid off workers follow under the baseline and layoff scenarios shows therefore how their careers are affected by job loss.
On average for all ages of job loss, about 8% of displaced workers eventually retire without finding a new job. This number consists of the 5% who exit the labor force right after a layoff without ever attempting to search for new work and another 3% who retire after unsuccessful job search. The effect is not uniform by the age of job loss. The fraction of workers who do not attempt to search for a new job peaks at age 62 (8%) which is the earliest age of eligibility for Social Security. The second smaller peak of 6.5% occurs as the sample reaches the full retirement age. The fraction of discouraged workers grows steadily with age from 1.5% to 5%, reflecting shorter horizon that older worker have for both search and work.
To isolate the impact of layoffs from the general age related retirement, I compare layoff and baseline scenarios and find that the majority (85%) of laid off workers work fewer months over the remaining lifetime. In terms of the number of hours, 75% decrease their labor supply. The average size of the labor supply reduction, depending on prefered measure, is either 5 months or 710 hours. Displaced workers claim the Social Security benefits on average five months earlier and hold about 2% less assets by the end of their lives. They are 8% more likely to be employed part time and are on average 30% less likely to work two years after a job loss than if they kept steady employment. The latter estimate is consistent with Chan and Stevens (2001) who find that two years after job loss employment rates of workers displaced at age 55 are 25% lower than those of non-displaced workers. My closest estimate is 24% for 58 year olds.
Previous studies have consistently emphasized that job loss is associated with early retirement (Coile and Levine, 2011a; Gustman et al., 2010; McFall, 2011) . Although my model predicts that on average job loss reduces the lifetime labor supply, there is a sizeable group of people who work more in the years following displacement. They account for 12% of laid off workers in terms of months and for 22% in terms of hours worked. Figure 3 traces how the number of hours and months worked changes depending on the age of layoff and the direction of response. Early retirees who reduce their labor supply on average work 8 months (1,230 hours) less than in the baseline scenario. Delayed retirement increases the lifetime labor supply by approximately 12 months (1,050 hours). More detailed comparisons reveal that the increase in the number of months worked predominantly happens through part time employment, while reduction is caused by sharp withdrawal from full time work.
Looking further into characteristics of laid off workers, I find that those who delay their retirement are on average higher wage earners with more wealth accumulated in assets. Layoffs therefore have a differentiated impact: they are more likely to drive low income workers out of the labor market, while making higher wage earners stay longer. This difference between low and high wage earners is consistent with Coile and Levine (2011a) who find that unemployment is associated with higher rates of early retirement among less educated workers. However, an important distinction from their result is that it is not just that the magnitude of impact that is bigger for poor and less educated. My model predicts that the sign of the relationship may be different depending on worker's profile, so that layoffs make some people work more over their lifetime.
Because reactions to layoffs vary, displacement outcomes in the economy depend on the composition of affected workers. If for example only workers in the lowest 10% of the wage distribution were laid off, than the fraction of delayed retirement would make up for just 5% of layoff cases. If displaced workers were in the median 20%, the rate of delayed retirement would have risen to 12%. It would have further increased to 16% if the top 20% of wage earners lost their jobs. These experiments are relevant because the compositions of workers affected by layoffs has been changing over time and may change again in the future. For example, the Great Recession has pushed into unemployment unprecedented number of white collar workers. They also highlight the importance of selection when the impact of layoff is estimated from the data on displaced workers with non laid off workers used as a reference group.
The cost of job loss
Displaced workers suffer from a number of consequences. The main is a permanent reduction in future earnings. In addition, they lose wage income while searching for new work, and pay the time cost of possibly long job search. They might need to divest assets before planned date in order to finance consumption during the search period. Finally, displaced workers who did not attain the normal retirement age and decide to rely on Social Security as a source of income are penalized for early withdrawal of benefits. In this section, I analyze the cost of displacement in terms of the lifetime consumption and income. Figure 4 shows the amount of discounted lifetime consumption and income lost by displaced workers for each age of layoff between fifty nine and seventy comparing to the workers who had a possibility to stay employed until voluntary retirement. Consumption loss is the highest at age sixty one: workers laid off at this age lose over ten thousand dollars in the re-maining lifetime consumption, almost twice as much as workers laid off at seventy. Younger workers are slightly better off because they have more time to adjust to the consequences of a layoff. Older workers lose less as their expected employment duration declines with age regardless of displacement experience.
The consequences in terms of lost income follow a similar pattern with the peak at age sixty one followed by gradual decline. The size of effect is much higher: workers laid off at sixty one lose almost twenty two thousand dollars in future discounted incomes. While the loss of consumption on average is only 3% of the lifetime amount, as much as 7% of income is lost on average for all ages of job loss. Figure 5 illustrates how the cost of job loss in terms of consumption differs depending on the level of wealth accumulated by affected workers. To analyze the cost of displacement by the level of assets, I focus on the workers laid off at 61, the age of the highest cost. Layoffs are not that costly (under $4,000) for about 15% of simulated individuals who receive the government transfers because their consumption is restricted by the statutory floor regardless of layoff status. The cost of layoff then increases fast in assets for workers in the lower part of the asset distribution conditional on not relying on government transfers. Workers who are hit the hardest are concentrated in the first to the third decile of the wealth distribution. After reaching the maximum of $15,000 for the second decile, the cost of layoff goes down for the workers in the middle of the distribution, and then raises slowly to from another small peak around the eighth decile. When the loss is expressed as a percentage decrease in the lifetime consumption, workers below the median of the asset distribution suffer the most, with the maximum cost of 6% in the first two deciles.
Job loss over the business cycle
I now consider how variability that job finding and layoff probabilities exhibit over the business cycle affects the labor force attachment and the cost of layoff. Using parameter estimates from the previous section, I simulate two dataset. The first uses actual probabilities of layoff and job finding observed between 2001 and 2012. The second takes job finding and layoff probabilities at the sample average for this period, thus eliminating the cyclical differences in labor market conditions for workers who approach retirement age at different time. I use these two datasets to compare dynamics of new retirements over time. Figure 6 shows the percentage difference of monthly new retirements in the data simulated with actual probabilities against the benchmark case that uses averages. New retirements exhibit systematic variability associated with deviation of job finding and layoff probabilities from average values, with the range of changes of about 13%. These deviations are correlated with cyclical changes of job finding and displacement. I show on the graph two NBER contrac-tions that have been registered over the period of study. A visible spike in the number of new retirements compared to the baseline case comes soon after the beginning of each recession.
Variations in job finding and layoff rates therefore matter, with more retirements happening in weak labor market. The model though requires large changes in the labor market conditions to generate visible shifts in retirement behavior. To be more specific, over the period of the Great Recession I register 33% decline of job finding and 140% percent increase of layoff probabilities that jointly translate into only 7% increase in the rate of monthly new retirements at the highest point in 2009.
The size of this response is not as big as would be expected based on the estimates from other studies. For example, Gustman et al. (2010) find a response of the number of new retirements to changes in asset values on a level of 0.5-1 percentage points. In my case the magnitude of impact never comes close to these values, even though it is considered that the impact of labor market conditions on retirement is stronger than the impact of changes in asset values. The highest annual difference I get is about 0.3 percentage points at the peak of the Great Recession impact in 2009-2010. The margin between early and delayed retirement decisions made by displaced depends on the labor market conditions. Varying the probability of job finding, I find that the number of workers who postpone retirement decision as a result of layoff decreases in the job finding probability. This means that delayed retirement manifests a response to the length of unemployment period.
This result challenges the literature that agrees that decline of financial markets is the primary force that keeps people at work longer, while weak labor markets are the cause of early retirement. My findings suggest that the choice between early and delayed retirement is not limited to the interplay of conditions in financial and labor markets, as labor market alone can either delay or approach retirement for different types of workers. This result is directly related to the ongoing discussion about early versus postponed retirement in the Great Recession. One of the striking features of this recession is the unusually high number of layoffs that have affected white collar workers. It appears that poor asset returns and the housing crisis are not be the only factors that make these workers postpone their retirement.
Layoffs and asset shocks
Another relevant aspect of retirement behavior over the business cycle that can not be ignored is the response of retirement decision to unforeseen changes in the value of assets and its interaction with layoffs. It is conventionally accepted that the layoffs accelerate, while asset devaluation postpones the retirement decision. The Great Recession has generated an ongoing debate on the joint impact of job displacement and asset devaluation on the time of retirement. Coile and Levine (2010) survey how the media opinion on the impact of the Great Recession on retirement plans of older workers evolved from predicting delayed retirement because of financial markets crash to predicting early retirement due to high unemployment. They claim that the joint impact will manifest as early retirement, which is different from my findings.
The Great Recession with stock market falling by more than 40% may sound as an extreme example. However it is not a unique occurrence in the recent years that makes the interest to the value of assets relevant. The argument can also be extended to dot-com bubble when the stocks fell by more than 30% between 2000 and 2002. In both cases fluctuations in asset values took place jointly with cyclical variations of job finding and layoff probabilities. This leads me to use the model in order to identify separately the impact of shocks to the asset values and the impact of reduction in job finding rates.
I start with adding unanticipated shock to the value of assets and computing the resulting change in the time of retirement depending on worker's age at the time of the shock. The results for a 20% and 50% drop in the values of assets are shown on Figure 7 . Based on the dynamics of stock market indicators mentioned in the previous paragraph, I treat 20% shock as more realistic scenario and 50% as an extreme, since relatively low share of retirement wealth is usually invested in stocks.
As expected, asset depreciation makes workers stay in the labor force longer. The peak of the impact occurs at age sixty one, which coincides with the peak of layoff impact. A 20% shock to the assets only delays retirement by 4 months, while a 50% shock produces a delay of almost one year. I should stress that the size of response to negative asset shocks cited here may be overestimated because I understate the role of recovery of the markets. Taking it into consideration, the finding is consistent with Gustman et al. (2010) who estimate that the burst of the dot-com bubble has delayed retirement on average by about 1.5 months.
Next, I compare the impact of asset devaluation to the impact of job displacement experienced at the same age. Displacement has a similar magnitude of impact on the first time retirement age as a 50% loss in assets, and the impact of 20% shock is about three times lower than the impact of displacement at any age.
Even though negative shocks to the assets and displacement impact the time of retirement in opposite directions, when happening simultaneously they do not exactly cancel out each other. This happens because devaluation of assets increases the share of workers who postpone their retirement in response to a layoff, and therefore the joint impact generates later retirement than what would be expected if it were just the sum of the two effects.
This fact is illustrated by the two dotted lines on Figure 6 . The first line shows the sum of changes in retirement age that are caused independently by 50% shock to the assets and a layoff at the same age. The sum of two impacts is almost zero. The second line shows model prediction of the joint impact the two shocks would produce when they happen simultaneously, and it consistently lies higher than the line illustrating the sum of impacts. The gap between two lines would get larger as the shocks to the assets increase. Therefore, a large change in the assets that occurs simultaneously to a job loss mitigates to some extent the impact of layoff on the retirement age.
I simulate the joint impact of layoffs and asset prices during the Great Recession on retirement age by using actual probabilities of layoff and job finding together with a 40% decrease in asset value in 2007. I compare this recession scenario to the one with mean job finding and layoff probabilities and no asset shocks. The model predicts that retirement will be delayed by five months under recession scenario. This result challenges the argument made by Coile and Levine (2010) that older workers affected by the Great Recession would on average retire earlier because of weak labor market even given the drop in the asset values. The difference in results is due to the fact that the two forces do not entirely cancel out each other, and, in addition, the fact that while the impact of layoffs is bigger, there are much fewer people affected by layoffs rather than by changes in asset returns.
Policy implications
The choice of measures would depend on the goals of policymakers. If the primary concern was to reduce the cost of job loss for the affected workers, then the main focus should be on workers in the lower deciles of the asset distribution laid off in their early sixties who did not rely on other sources of the government aid before losing the job. The appropriate measures in this case would involve reduction of the Social Security penalty for early retirement and compensation of layoff related wage loss. The compensation mechanism could work either through tax refunds to reemployed displaced workers, minimum wage regulations, or retraining of laid off workers to make up for skill depreciation. It is possible that a policy maker would only be interested in smoothing the impact of layoffs over the business cycle. In this case a combination of the measures discussed above can be implemented on a temporary basis.
If on the other hand the goal is to help older laid off workers stay in the labor force longer and make up for the losses, then one would be interested in removing the spike of exits form the labor force following layoffs at ages 62 through 65 and changing the balance between early and delayed retirements. Compensate of the wage losses could be appropriate measure in this case as well. The labor force attachment can also be strengthened by increasing the scope of employer provided health insurance. If the cost of job search mattered enough, making search cheaper and easier could retain more displaced older workers in the market. Finally, the number of workers who exit the labor force after a layoff goes down as the Social Security age increases.
To illustrate the impact of these policies, I measure how the cost of displacement responds to changes in some of the model parameters. I experiment with the following sources of utility cost: the probability of job finding, the cost of search, the wage penalty due to displacement, and the penalty for early Social Security withdrawal. As expected, the strongest response of the utility cost is to wage penalty. This happens due to the long term nature of the impact. Reduction of wage penalty from .3 to .15 practically eliminates any consumption losses for workers displaced either before sixty or after sixty five, and decreases the loss almost three times for workers who lost a job at sixty one, the age of the maximum impact. The second important factor is the penalty for early Social Security withdrawal. A change of annual penalty from .08 to .04 leads to a 20% decline of consumption lost by workers who were displaced at sixty one. The long term impact of changes in the probability of job finding or the cost of search are about the same and result in only minor gains to the lifetime consumption.
Conclusions
I develop a dynamic programming model of optimal retirement and labor supply decisions over the life cycle to analyze the retirement experiences of workers depending on whether they have been affected by layoffs, the age at which they have lost job, and the economic conditions at the time of job loss. The estimated effects of displacement on the labor force attachment is similar to those found in other studies. Compared to workers who did not experience job loss, displaced workers are on average 30% less likely to work two years after losing job. They are 30% more likely to withdraw Social Security at sixty two, and hold about 2% less assets by the end of life.
Displacement costs measured in terms of discounted lifetime consumption are highest for the workers laid off at sixty one, shortly before reaching the early retirement age. In terms of the level of assets accumulated by the time of layoff, the cost peaks for workers in the first three deciles of the asset distribution who did not rely on the government assistance before job loss. Their average lifetime consumption loss of displacement is about 3%. Most of this loss is attributed to wage reduction following displacement, with penalty for early withdrawal of Social Security being the next important factor. The costs of search and the probability of job finding do not explain much of the post-displacement utility loss.
Displacement on average leads to early retirement, however there exists nontrivial fraction of workers who postpone their retirement as a response to layoff. Among workers displaced at age sixty 12% retire later than they would have done without a job loss. These are usually healthy high income earners with larger average assets. The fraction of workers who postpone retirement is lower when the labor markets are weak.
Analysis of retirement over the business cycle shows that there are more retirements when the labor markets are weak, although the size of response of new retirements to changes in job finding and layoff probabilities is modest. Comparing the impact of displacement and shocks to the assets on the timing of retirement, I find that the two work in opposite direction. Displacement on average approaches retirement by the same time as a 50% drop in the value of assets postpones it. However when occurring simultaneously, the two effects do not entirely cancel each other because more workers delay retirement when asset holdings are low. Negative asset shocks therefore mitigate the impact of job displacement on the time of retirement.
As a corollary from this finding, strengthened by the fact that that layoffs affect fewer workers than asset shocks do, I predict that the simultaneous shocks to the values of assets, layoff and job finding probabilities similar to those observed during the Great Recession would make the population on average to postpone retirement by five months. The fraction of discounted lifetime utility lost by displaced workers over remaining lifetime by age of job loss, n = 50, 000. Dashed lines show utility cost for the entire sample under two scenarios where the wage displacement penalty and the Social Security early withdrawal penalty are reduced respectively by a factor of two. The figure shows the response of the first time retirement age in months to displacement and devaluation of assets experienced at different ages. Based on n = 50, 000 simulated individuals. Job finding and layoff probabilities fixed at mean values. Estimation sample is HRS white males 50 and older. The values reported are marginal effects from logit maximum likelihood estimation computed at mean value of age and lag health equal to 0. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Income types are determined from the quartiles of average monthly earnings. Conditional maximum likelihood estimates of equation (11). Estimation sample is HRS white males. Zero medical expenses were omitted from estimation. Conditional maximum likelihood estimates of equation (11). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Estimation sample is HRS white males. Zero medical expenses were omitted from estimation. Conditional maximum likelihood estimates of equation (12). Estimation sample is HRS white males age 50 and above, excludes top and bottom 1% of wage rate values. 
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